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Economic and Social Rights: Reflection to 
Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the 
Declaration of Human Rights 
STEVE KAHANOVITZ* 
 
It was an honor to be gathered with the Maryland Law 
Symposium‘s audience, whose members, in a whole range of both 
individual and collective ways, have played an enormous role in the 
development and implementation of human rights throughout the 
world.  In the brief space that this short essay allows, I am going to 
try to explain the developments in respect of socio-economic rights, 
particularly the right of access to housing in South Africa, and reach 
a conclusion.   
I work at the Legal Resources Centre.1  I have had the honor of 
leading it and some of its offices at different stages.  My personal 
reflection stems from seeing houses often destroyed by an apartheid 
state, the enactment of the Constitution, the initial cases where we 
nervously litigated on socio-economic rights, and now the continued 
enforcement and interpretation of our Bill of Rights.  In a country 
where unemployment and poverty are the most striking charac-
teristics, and in a city where more than 400,000 people live in shacks, 
my reflection here is to set out briefly the manner in which the 
realization of socio-economic rights, as contained in the Constitution, 
can deliver a better life for all in the country; ensure that there is 
substantive equality before the law; and, in the words of the Preamble 
to the Constitution, ―improve the quality of life of all citizens and 
free the potential of each person.‖   
 
* Attorney, Legal Resources Centre, Cape Town, South Africa. 
1. More information about this organization is available at http://www.lrc.org.za/About. 
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My job primarily is to ensure that people who often would not be 
able to easily get access to lawyers enjoy what the Constitution 
provides.  We seek to ensure that, as provided for in section 7(2) of 
the Constitution, the South African state strives to ―respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights;‖ the constitution 
thus is intentioned to encourage transformation.2   
How do we capture what clients often say about rights?  I think, as 
Arthur Chaskalson pointed out during his opening speech,3 clients 
often know that their rights have been infringed.  They come and see 
us as lawyers, not to tell them that their rights have been infringed, 
but to help them understand what is happening and to seek remedies.  
And under South Africa‘s apartheid system, there were very few 
remedies.  We grappled with the law; we looked for gaps as we 
interpreted statutes.  Due to the influence of the Universal Declar-
ation of Human Rights, and the adoption of our new South African 
Constitution, there are now remedies available in our courts, and 
hopefully our courts will continue to order them.  Our state needs to 
create conditions in which poor communities are able to grapple, to 
mediate, and to negotiate on the basis of their rights, and if we are not 
able to achieve that—to go to court and actually ensure that there is a 
way in which their rights are respected, protected, promoted, and 
fulfilled—then we have not fulfilled what our Constitution provides.   
On the day this symposium began, a letter written by the Centre on 
Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) was delivered to the Mayor 
of Durban, a city committed to the fulfillment of constitutional rights.  
COHRE works very closely with the social movement Abahlali 
baseMjondolo in Durban, which now represents thousands of home-
less people in one of the fastest growing social movements in South 
Africa.  In the letter, COHRE writes: 
  COHRE recently learnt of the threatened forced relocation 
of shack-dwellers in Siyanda in KwaMashu, to make way for 
the construction of a freeway in the area.  According to a press 
statement by the newly-formed Siyanda branch of Abahlali 
baseMjondolo, at least 50 shacks have been demolished this 
year in the area by the eThekwini Municipality without notice, 
a court order or the provision of alternative accommodation.  
 
2. See, e.g., Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Envtl. Affairs & Tourism 2004 (4) SA 490 
(CC) paras. 74, 76 (S. Afr.). 
3. Arthur Chaskalson, Dignity and Justice for All, 24 MD. J. INT‘L L. 24 (2009). 
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COHRE has learnt that eThekwini Municipality promised that 
all those displaced by the new MR-577 freeway would be 
moved to newly-constructed houses in the Kulula Housing 
Project.  Siyanda residents have now been informed that an 
unspecified number of families will be moved to eNtuzuma 
and placed in ‗transit camps,‘ which consist of government-
built shacks or temporary structures, ordinarily used for emer-
gency housing.  As eNtuzuma is further on the periphery of the 
city, transport costs will be much higher for families as they 
will be further from jobs and schools.  At the same time, the 
Municipality has reportedly decided to move families from 
other areas like Umlazi and Lamontville, who are not affected 
by the freeway construction, into the newly constructed Kulula 
houses.  This has understandably caused much confusion 
within the community, and the situation is extremely tense at 
present.4 
Now, none of that is particularly surprising in a rapidly urbanizing 
environment.  None of it is particularly surprising in South Africa.  
The question that we need to ask is not why it is happening, but 
rather, whether and to what extent the government‘s carrying out, and 
people affected by, evictions and relocations are going to be informed 
and governed by the Constitution?  Furthermore, to what extent do 
those most prejudiced accept that the Constitution will protect, 
respect, promote, and fulfil their rights, and that they will not have to 
face a situation where they feel so unprotected by the Constitution 
that letters like COHRE‘s have to be written on a daily basis. 
THE DECLARATION AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION‘S BILL 
OF RIGHTS 
The South African people held their first democratic election on 
April 27, 1994.  Legislatively, it was preceded by Act 200 of 1993—
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa—that enshrined 
South Africa‘s first Bill of Rights.  It also provided for a whole range 
of transitional mechanisms and the creation of a Constitutional 
Assembly, which was to be the engine room for the drafting of South 
Africa‘s first democratically accepted constitution. 
 
4. Letter from Salih Booker, Executive Director, Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions, to Obed Mlaba, Mayor, Durban, South Africa (Oct. 24, 2008), available at 
http://www.abahlali.org/node/4266. 
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (―Declaration‖), 
signed sixty years ago and celebrated here at this symposium, has its 
roots in the U.N. Charter, which was signed on June 26, 1945.  
Notably, South Africa was one of the eight abstentions when forty-
eight nations approved the Declaration.  On June 26, 1955, exactly 
ten years after the signing of the U.N. Charter and seven years into 
the apartheid state, the Freedom Charter was signed in South Africa 
by those struggling against apartheid.  The origins of South Africa‘s 
Bill of Rights can be seen in it, and, significantly, it contains a range 
of aspirations in regard to socio-economic issues that today have been 
enshrined in our Constitution as socio-economic rights.5  In Mark 
Gevisser‘s biography of Thabo Mbeki, he writes of a recognition 
within the African National Congress to move the Freedom Charter 
from the stage of being a Charter to ensuring that there could be a 
programmatic enshrinement of the rights referred to in the Charter—
and perhaps that was one of the beginning points of ensuring that the 
South African Constitution eventually contained socio-economic 
rights.6 
The South African Constitution was subjected to extensive debate, 
consultation, and thereafter certification7 by the Constitutional Court 
to ensure that its provisions complied with the principles for the 
Constitution which had been adopted as part of the transitional 
process.  It was only after the Constitutional Court had certified the 
new Constitution that it became law as Act 108 of 1996. 
The Constitution provides that in interpreting it, reference should 
be made to international law.  Section 233 of the Constitution 
requires that ―when interpreting any legislation, every court must 
prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is 
consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation 
that is inconsistent with international law.‖  Therefore, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenants (even the not-yet-
ratified International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
 
5. The Freedom Charter‘s recognition of civil, political, and socio-economic rights 
preceded the international Covenants by more than twenty years (in 1976, both the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) came into force).  After the fall of the 
apartheid regime, South Africa later signed both Covenants on October 3, 1994, but has 
ratified only the ICCPR. 
6. MARK GEVISSER, THABO MBEKI: THE DREAM DEFERRED (2007). 
7. In re Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of S. Afr., 
1996, 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) (S.Afr.) (certifying the final constitution). 
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Rights) are key to the interpretation of our Bill of Rights.  Chapter 2 
of the South African Constitution provides for a Bill of Rights.  Its 
last clause, section 39, provides that: 
1. When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or 
forum 
a. must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom; 
b. must consider international law; and 
c. may consider foreign law. 
Thus is set the constitutional and statutory basis for a solid 
relationship between international human rights law and the South 
African Constitution. 
Following the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
subsequent development of the Covenants, we have regularly iden-
tified the socio-economic rights in our constitution as those dealing 
with education, health, housing, and social welfare.  The distinctions 
at times are problematic, and our courts have emphasized the 
indivisibility of all rights and the need to balance them. 
The first Constitutional Court attempt to obtain definition in 
respect of economic, social, and cultural rights was in the Soobra-
money case, in which the Constitutional Court considered whether a 
terminally ill diabetic was entitled to receive dialysis treatment at a 
state hospital in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution 
which entitle everyone to have access to health care services provided 
by the state.8  As practitioners representing poor people, the judgment 
quite honestly scared us: the defendant government had set out 
extensively and in a detailed fashion the financial position regarding 
KwaZulu hospitals and medicine, and we feared that in the future we 
would land up dealing with these matters almost as accountants and 
auditors rather than as defenders of constitutional rights.   
SECTION 26 AND SOUTH AFRICA‘S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
HOUSING 
In the housing field, the South African Constitution at section 26 
provides that: 
 
8. Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) 
(interpreting section 27 of the South African Constitution) (S. Afr.). 
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1. Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the pro-
gressive realisation of this right. 
3. No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home 
demolished, without an order of court made after considering 
all the relevant circumstances.  No legislation may permit 
arbitrary evictions.9 
The new democratically elected post-apartheid government was 
particularly keen to ensure delivery of housing.  In the first five years 
of our democracy, various significant pieces of legislation were 
enacted to realize the rights contained in section 26, including the 
Housing Act,10 the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act,11 the Extension of Security of Tenure Act,12 
and several others. 
Private land owners and the government often evict poor people, 
with the government often alleging it is for their own good and 
necessary for development purposes.  Millions of poor people, who 
faced the brunt of eviction under the Prevention of Illegal Squatting 
Act13 of the apartheid state, and who had often been evicted without 
court order, could now rely on the housing provisions in the 
Constitution and the new legislation that was being enforced. 
Accordingly, a single mother, Mrs. Ross,14 came to us after 
receiving an eviction notice, which we successfully challenged by 
arguing that the court summons was defective as it had been issued 
without the applicant even pleading the constitutionally required ―all 
the relevant circumstances,‖ and was thus in violation of her section 
26 rights under the Constitution.15 
A gamut of cases followed in many of our provincial divisions of 
 
9. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 26. 
10. Housing Act 107 of 1997. 
11. Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 
1998. 
12. Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. 
13. Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951. 
14. Ross v South Peninsula Municipality 2000 (1) SA 589 (C).  Note that in later 
subsequent matters, this judgment was correctly held by the Supreme Court of Appeal to 
have been incorrect. 
15. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 26(3) (―No one may be evicted from their home, or have their 
home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circum-
stances.  No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.‖). 
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the court.  Conservative commentators regularly decried the judg-
ments and stated that we were about to become like Zimbabwe (we 
still hear that sometimes), that private property was not being 
respected, etc. 
Then came along the case which is now celebrated as the seminal 
case on socio-economic rights—the Grootboom case.16  It inter alia 
provided: 
(1) that socio-economic rights are justiciable; 
(2) that while the city of Cape Town had developed a plan for poor 
people in respect of housing, as it did not make provision for those 
most desperately in need, it did not pass constitutional muster; and 
(3) that ‗reasonableness‘ was the key test for establishing whether 
policy met constitutional muster.  The Court did not accept (and at a 
later stage outright rejected) the submission that it should develop a 
concept of the core content of a right to assist in interpretation. 
For our purposes in celebration of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, it is notable that the Court in Grootboom grappled 
with the extent to which the ICESCR should be used as a ―guide to an 
interpretation of section 26 [of the Constitution]‖:17 
Section 39 of the Constitution obliges a court to consider 
international law as a tool to interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights.  In Makwanyane Chaskalson P, in the context of 
section 35(1) of the interim Constitution, said: ―. . . public 
international law would include nonbinding as well as binding 
law.  They may both be used under the section as tools of 
interpretation. International agreements and customary 
international law accordingly provide a framework within 
which [the Bill of Rights] can be evaluated and under-
stood . . . .‖ 
  . . . . 
  The amici submitted that the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the Covenant) is of 
significance in understanding the positive obligations created 
by the socio-economic rights in the Constitution. . . . 
  . . . . 
  The differences between the relevant provisions of the 
Covenant and our Constitution are significant in determining 
 
16. South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
17. Id. para. 28. 
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the extent to which the provisions of the Covenant may be a 
guide to an interpretation of section 26.  These differences, in 
so far as they relate to housing, are: 
(a) The Covenant provides for a right to adequate housing 
while section 26 provides for the right of access to 
adequate housing.   
(b) The Covenant obliges states parties to take appropriate 
steps which must include legislation while the Constitution 
obliges the South African state to take reasonable 
legislative and other measures.18 
The Court in Grootboom determined that concepts such as a state‘s 
―minimum core obligation‖ to provide housing may play out 
differently under the South African Constitution, and found the 
analysis of the U.N. committee interpreting the Covenant ―helpful in 
plumbing the meaning of ‗progressive realisation‘ [of the right to 
housing] in the context of our Constitution.‖19 
The housing area remains one of the most litigated and contested 
areas in our law.  We have seen since Grootboom several devel-
opments, and I will briefly try and explain them.  Firstly, it has 
increased procedural protections available to poor people.  Secondly, 
the rights first outlined in section 26 of the Constitution have now 
developed much more substantive content.  The substantive issues 
that have generated the most comment are the rights to consultation20 
and provision of alternative accommodation prior to eviction.21 
Thirdly, in opposing evictions, the litigation has assisted in 
developing an extended range of remedies available to poor people 
including: in Fose (not a housing rights case), the Constitutional 
Court held that ―appropriate relief‖ must mean an effective remedy 
and therefore courts are not limited only to those remedies that 
existed prior to the new Constitution, and could fashion new types of 
remedies so as to enforce the Bill of Rights;22 thereafter in the 
 
18. Id. paras. 26–28 (quoting State v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para. 35 (S. 
Afr.)) (first emphasis added) (first and second alterations in original) (footnotes omitted). 
19. Id. paras. 33, 45. 
20. See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC)            
(S. Afr.); Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Beria Twp. v City of Johannesburg 2008 (3) SA 208 
(CC) (S. Afr.). 
21. See Port Elizabeth Municipality, (1) SA 217; Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, (3) SA 
208.  
22. Fose v Minister of Safety & Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para. 69 (S. Afr.). 
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Valhalla Park decision,23 use was made of structural interdicts; 
Modderklip,24 which required compensation; and in Dada and 
Others,25 in which the Court went so far as to order the local authority 
to purchase property for the use of those living in it and facing 
eviction.  Thus we have seen, in a range of different cases, courts 
grant declarators, or structural interdicts, or order damages, or the 
rebuilding of unlawfully demolished structures, and more as they 
develop these remedies. 
Briefly stated, the owner and landlord of old now has to come to 
terms with the fact that neither international nor domestic law will 
allow apartheid-style evictions without court orders, as they took 
place at the behest of security forces, and that in seeking the evictions 
of persons who possibly are unlawfully occupying property, they 
would of necessity and obligation have to apply to evict those not 
wanting to leave by court order, which application would not be 
granted simply on the basis of non-payment of rent, or illegality of 
occupation. 
In the course of these developments in our constitutional housing 
law, there has been much reliance on the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and on the Covenants.  I have already pointed out how 
the Court referred to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in the Grootboom matter,26 and has further done 
so since then.  In other matters dealing with socio-economic rights, 
the following is also worthy of note. 
In Jaftha v Schoeman,27 when the Court considered the constitu-
tionality of a law permitting ―the sale in execution of peoples‘ homes 
because they have not paid their debts, thereby removing their 
security of tenure,‖28 the Court noted: 
  Although the concept of adequate housing was briefly 
discussed in [Grootboom,] this Court has yet to consider it in 
any detail.  This subject has however been dealt with by the 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
 
23. City of Cape Town v Rudolph 2004 (5) SA (C) (S. Afr.). 
24. President of the Republic of S. Afr. v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd. 2005 (5) SA 3 
(CC) at 4 (S. Afr.). 
25. Dada v Unlawful Occupiers of Portion 41, No. 05/16270, slip op. (WLD Feb. 15, 
2008) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/48.pdf. 
26. South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
27. 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
28. Id. para. 1. 
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Rights . . . in the context of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights . . . . In terms of section 
39(1)(b) of the Constitution, this Court must consider inter-
national law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.  Therefore, 
guidance may be sought from international instruments that 
have considered the meaning of adequate housing.29 
The Court then referred to Article 11(1) of the Covenant, which 
recognizes the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for 
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing, and 
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.  
The Court continued:  
  In its General Comment 4, the Committee, giving content to 
article 11(1) of the Covenant, emphasised the need not to give 
the right to housing a restrictive interpretation and to see it as 
―the right to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity.‖  
The position of the Committee reflects the view adopted by 
this Court in Grootboom, that the right to dignity is inherently 
linked with socio-economic rights.  It is important, for the 
purposes of this case, to point to the Committee‘s recognition 
that ―the concept of adequacy is particularly significant in 
relation to the right to housing.‖  While acknowledging that 
adequacy ―is determined in part by social, economic, cultural, 
climatic, ecological and other factors‖, it has identified 
―certain aspects of the right that must be taken into account for 
this purpose in any particular context.‖  Of relevance is the 
focus on security of tenure.  The Committee points out that 
security of tenure takes many forms, not just ownership, but 
that ―all persons should possess a degree of security of tenure 
which guarantees legal protection against forced eviction, 
harassment and other threats.‖30 
In a subsequent matter—one in many ways equally important to 
Grootboom—where the Court ordered the government to roll out 
Neviropene to HIV-positive women,31 it again turned to international 
law and noted in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign:  
  It was contended that section 27(1) of the Constitution 
 
29. Id. para. 23 (footnotes omitted). 
30. Id. para. 24 (footnotes omitted). 
31. Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) para. 135 (S. 
Afr.). 
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establishes an individual right vested in everyone.  This right, 
so the contention went, has a minimum core to which every 
person in need is entitled.  The concept of ―minimum core‖ 
was developed by the United Nations Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights which is charged with 
monitoring the obligations undertaken by state parties to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.  According to the Committee: ―a State party in which 
any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential 
foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter 
and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima 
facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant.  
If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to 
establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely 
deprived of its raison d’être.  By the same token, it must be 
noted that any assessment as to whether a State has discharged 
its minimum core obligations must also take account of 
resource constraints applying within the country concerned.  
Article 2(1) obligates each State party to take the necessary 
steps ‗to the maximum of its available resources‘.  In order for 
a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its 
minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources it 
must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all 
resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a 
matter of priority, those minimum obligations.‖32  
The Court then reiterated a central holding of both Soobramoney 
and Grootboom: that in considering an alleged constitutional 
violation of socio-economic rights, judges should evaluate the 
reasonableness of the state‘s policy rather than calibrate a minimum 
core individual entitlement to socio-economic rights.33  
These cases, all read together, demonstrate a very significant shift 
in the power balance between those who have unfairly always been 
able to own, occupy, and control property in South Africa to one 
where even the law, notwithstanding provisions protecting private 
property, recognizes the need to establish a far more equitable 
arrangement. 
In addition to what already appears in judgments, written arg-
 
32. Id. para. 26. 
33. Id. paras. 29–39. 
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uments in many cases now refer to international law, and in housing 
cases we now often also rely on the general comments of  the U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  The recently 
adopted Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate 
Housing34 is already cited, so as to ensure that international law is 
used.   
The private property brigade has often viewed this with great 
disdain.  There have been various attempts to amend the key 
legislation.  The private law shift, however, is one which ensures that 
rights are ―respected, protected, promoted and fulfilled, according to 
the values of our constitution,‖ and most eminent of property 
lawyers, Professor Van Der Walt, has been cited with approval by the 
Court when he viewed the need: 
to move away from a static, typically private law conceptualist 
view of the Constitution as a guarantee of the status quo to a 
dynamic typically public-law view of the Constitution as an 
instrument for social change and transformation under the 
auspices [and I would add ‗and control‘] of entrenched 
constitutional values.35 
Lastly, there were 6,000 people living on the railway line in 
Khayelitsha who were facing eviction.  They instructed their lawyers 
not to oppose the eviction necessarily, but to reply that they were 
willing to relocate on condition that there was an alternative place to 
move.  The 6,000 people on the railway line joined three spheres of 
government to the litigation.  They joined the local government, 
provincial government, and the national government.  And they said 
that Grootboom held that there were particular responsibilities in 
regard to the government making provision for those most 
desperately in need.  They were not concerned about which sphere of 
government took on the responsibility, but that it was particularly 
important that at least one of them took responsibility for ―if and 
when‖ these 6,000 people were to move.  The three spheres of 
government pleaded, and a week before the case was to commence, 
the case was settled.   
 
34. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm‘n on Human Rights, Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate 
Standard of Living, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/18 (Feb. 5, 2007) (prepared by Miloon Kothari). 
35. Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para. 16 (S. 
Afr.) (alteration in original). 
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The important aspect of that case is that now, three years after its 
settlement, and in the last year, those 6,000 people have moved off 
the railway line.  They have used the policies that were developed 
post-Grootboom, the policies in regard to urgent emergency housing 
programs and the policies in regard to the upgrading of informal 
settlements, as the bases for negotiating new residences five kilo-
meters from where they were living.  They have moved onto fully 
serviced sites that have electricity and water connected.  Thus there is 
a noticeable shift from a situation before the Constitution came into 
operation, and now, thankfully, people are able to mobilize and 
organize around the rights developed and enforced in our courts, and 
are actually able to ensure that there is no eviction or an agreed-upon 
relocation.  Hopefully for those who are asserting their rights in 
Durban, as I quoted at the beginning of this reflection, similar type 
provisions can operate. 
CONCLUSION 
The South African Constitution is unique in that it mandates 
consideration of international law in interpreting our Bill of Rights.  
This mandate has resulted in a careful consideration of the Declar-
ation and its subsequent Covenants in over thirty cases so far in the 
Court‘s short history.  Several of these cases concern socio-economic 
rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in particular has been a significant guide to the Court 
as it struggles to give meaning to the ambitious guarantees of our 
Constitution.   
 
